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ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE
ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY STATE OFFICERS*
Alan C. Kohnt
The admissibility of evidence obtained in an illegal search and
seizure is a problem which has plagued the Supreme Court of the
United States with increasing frequency during the past 75 years.
The latest wrinkle in the uneven course of the problem's judicial de-
velopment has been the statement of Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for a unanimous Court in Benanti -v. United States,' that it "has
remained an open question in this Court whether evidence obtained
solely by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible in the
federal courts despite the Fourth Amendment." This assertion war-
rants careful examination. If it is true that the use in federal courts
of evidence illegally seized by state3 agents has "remained an open
question," has it remained open throughout three hundred and fifty-
four volumes of United States Reports? If the question has previously
been decided, has the language of the Chief Justice cast the only doubt
upon that decision, or have other recent adjudications by the Supreme
Court disclosed the apparent need for a new look? Further, if a new
look is to be taken, what should be its result? The purpose of this
article is to examine the problem of use in federal court of evidence
illegally seized by state officers, first, by considering the historic basis
t Member of the Missouri Bar; associated with the firm of Coburn & Croft,
St. Louis, Missouri.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and the helpful assis-
tance in the preparation of this article of Mr. Norman Dorsen of the New York
and District of Columbia Bars.
1. 355 U.S. 96 (1956).
2. Id. at 102, n.10.
3. Throughout this article, the word "state" will be used to describe state,
county, city, or other local authorities.
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and past judicial treatment of the problem, and, second, by consider-
ing how this "open question" should ultimately be decided by the
Supreme Court.
I. THE PRIOR COURSE OF DECISION
A. Uncertain Beginnings-Boyd and Adams
The starting point is Boyd v. United States," variously described as
"a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the
United States"' and as an "ill-starred" case "which has exercised
unhealthy influence upon subsequent judicial opinion."' The Govern-
ment, after seizing 35 cases of plate glass allegedly imported from
Liverpool, England, with intent to defraud the United States of the
duty on the merchandise, filed an information in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York seeking their forefeiture.
Boyd and others entered a claim for the goods and denied the alleged
fraud. During trial, upon motion by the district attorney, the trial
court entered an order pursuant to Section 5 of the Act of June 22,
1874,7 directing the claimants to produce the invoice for the glass.
Section 5 provided that if the paper ordered produced is not brought
into court, then the allegations contained in the motion of the district
attorney concerning the contents of the paper shall be taken as con-
fessed.8 . The claimants produced the invoice under protest and it was
received in evidence over the objection that the law requiring its
production was unconstitutional. The jury returned a verdict for the
United States and a judgment of forfeiture was accordingly entered.
The judgment was affirmed, on appeali and review was then obtained
in the Supreme Court.
Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court, held that Section 5, as ap-
plied, violated both the fourth amendment, prohibiting "unreasonable
searches and seizures,"9 and the claimants' privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 0 Admittedly adopt-
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis).
6. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
7. 18 Stat. -187 (1874), 19 U.S.C. § 535 (1952).
8. Ibid.
9. U.S. Const. amend. IV, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
10. U.S. Const. amend. V, provides'in" pertinent part that "[n]o person..
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... ."
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ing a liberal construction" of these two constitutional amendments,
the Court held, in an unnecessarily broad opinion,' -2 that "the com-
pulsory extortion of a man's... private papers to be used in evidence
to convict him"' 3 is the "essence"' 14 of a violation of both the fourth
and fifth amendments. Justice Miller, joined by Chief Justice Waite,
concurred in a separate opinion.25 They found no search and seizure
at all, much less an "unreasonable" one, but only a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The opinion of the Court is significant in three respects. First, the
Court based its decision forbidding the "compulsory production of a
man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him," 26 upon the
plain meaning of the fourth amendment itself, rather than upon a
judicial rule of exclusion adopted in the exercise of the Court's super-
visory power over the conduct of federal criminal cases?7 Indeed, no
such judicial rule could have been adopted in view of the fact that
such a rule can be imposed by the Supreme Court only in the absence
of an expression of congressional will. 8 Here, the Court was deter-
mining the constitutionality of a statute which explicitly authorized
the receipt in evidence of material produced by compulsory order.
Second, the Court said that although the police did not break into
Boyd's home in order to obtain the invoice for the glass, still such
elements of force were merely "circumstances of aggravation"2
in determining whether there is a violation of the fourth amendment.
Thus, it is clear from the opinion that if, as the Court held, an act of
Congress compelling a person to produce incriminatory matter for use
at trial is a violation of the fourth amendment, a fortiori it is a vio-
lation of that amendment if a person's home is forcibly searched by
federal agents and incriminatory material is seized and put in evi-
dence against him in a criminal case. Third, the broad pronounce-
ment of the Court gave both the fourth and fifth amendments sub-
stantially identical meaning with regard to the use as evidence of
11. 116 U.S. at 635.
12. There was no need for the Court to determine whether Section 5 violated
both the fourth and fifth amendments; a violation of one of the amendments was
sufficient to invalidate the law.
13. 116 U.S. at 630. The Court held that although the proceeding was tech-
nically a civil one, it was "in substance and effect a criminal one" since the infor-
mation alleged the commission of acts also made criminal by the statute under
which the proceeding was brought. Id. at 634.
14. Id. at 630.
15. Id. at 638.
16. Id. at 622.
17. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
18. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
19. 116 U.S. at 630.
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illegally seized property.20 The Court indicated that both amendments
are violated where a defendant is searched and his personal property
is seized and later used againat him at his trial.2 1
The prospects that the pronouncement in Boyd might ever become
an enduring principle of constitutional law apparently were eliminated
nineteen years later, in 1904, when the Court handed down its decision
in Adams v. New York.2 2 Armed with a search warrant authorizing
the search of .Adams' office for gambling materials, New York state
police officers entered the office and seized not only 3500 policy slips
used in the "numbers game" but also certain other papers unconnected
with gambling which contained samples of Adams' handwriting. Sub-
sequently, Adams was tried in a New York court for the crime of
knowingly having in his possession gambling paraphernalia. Over
his objection, the papers containing his handwriting were received in
evidence for the purpose of proving that it was Adams' handwriting
which appeared on the policy slips. Adams was convicted and the case
ultimately reached the Supreme Court-of the United States. Relying
on Boyd, Adams contended that the receipt in evidence of the papers
containing his handwriting violated the fourth and fifth amendments
and that these amendments were applicable to state action through
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 23
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It found no need to
determine the applicability of the fourth and fifth amendments to the
states since it held that even had this been action by federal agents
and had the evidence been admitted in federal court, such admission
would not violate the fourth or fifth amendment. Although the Court
said it did not want "to detract from [the] authority'' 24 of Boyd, it
proceeded to emasculate the holding in that case by reverting to the
common law rule25 that a court will not take notice of how evidence
is obtained. The Court said that as long as evidence is pertinent to
an issue in the case, it does not matter whether or not that evidence
has been illegally seized.26
The Court thus took a full 180 degree turn from the broad, sweep-
ing decision in Boyd, which had held that the use of evidence obtained
by compulsory process violated the fourth amendment. Adam made
the source of evidence of no consequence so long as that evidence was
pertinent to the issue in controversy. Although tP at case could pos-
20. Id. at 633-35.
21. Ibid.
22. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). The Court's personnel had changed entirely, except
for the first Justice Harlan, in the period between Boyd and Adams.
23. Id. at 594.
24. Id. at 597.
25. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
26. 192 U.S. at 594-96.
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sibly be interpreted narrowly as holding merely that the search was
lawful, such an interpretation seems unsupportable because the search
warrant did not purport to authorize the seizure of the papers con-
taining Adams' handwriting.
B. The Resolution-Weeks
It was ten years before the Court resolved the contradiction be-
tween the common law principle apparently adopted in Adams and
the broad pronouncement in Boyd. The decision came in Weeks v.
United States.27 Kansas City police officers, acting without a warrant,
searched Weeks' home and seized a number of incriminating docu-
ments and articles. Later the same day, still acting without a warrant,
the city police returned to Weeks' home with the United States Mar-
shal, and together they carried away additional incriminatory matter.
Evidence seized during both searches was transmitted to the Marshal
and was subsequently used in obtaining Weeks' conviction in federal
court
On appeal to the Supreme Court,28 as in his original petition,"
Weeks did not distinguish between material seized by city police alone
during the first search and material seized by them and the United
States Marshal during the second search. He treated all property as
seized by "officers of the Government '' 30 and contended that the seizure
and subsequent receipt in evidence infringed the fourth and fifth
amendments.3 1 Weeks relied primarily on the Boyd case, 3 - while the
Government contended that his position was foreclosed by Adams.3
Justice Day, who wrote the opinion in Adams, also delivered the
Weeks opinion-an opinion which took the surprising course of bury-
ing Adams and unearthing Boyd. The Court held that the articles
seized by the Marshal could not be received in evidence but that the
articles seized solely by the Kansas City police were admissible.
Adams was distinguished on the ground that defendant there had
waived any objection to the use of the handwriting samples when he
failed to file a timely application prior to trial seeking their return.3 4
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, passim, especially pp. 29-55, Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
29. 232 U.S. at 387-88.
30. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, p. 29, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 387.
31. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, pp. 29-55, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 387-88.
32. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, pp. 29-55, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
33. 232 U.S. at 385-86.
34. There was such an application prior to Weeks' trial.
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Moreover, the Court said that the seizure in the Adams case was
reasonable, while in Weeks the seizure was unreasonable.35 The dis-
tinctions drawn.by the Court do not succeed in concealing its affinity
for the analysis in Boyd and its departure from the common law rule,
as expressed in Adams, for the Adams opinion attached no apparent
significance to the fact that there was no pretrial motion to suppress
the material seized. Furthermore, as already pointed out,36 the seizure
of the samples of Adams' handwriting was apparently unreasonable
since the search warrant extended only to gambling paraphernalia.
Besides its renunciation of the common law rule recognized in
Adam, the Weeks case has two other notable features. First, unlike
Boyd, which indicated- that the use of evidence illegally seized by
federal officers itself violated the fourth amendment,37 the Court in
Weeks based its decision excluding such evidence upon a judicially
created rule of exclusion rather than upon the command of the Con-
stitution. It said that it would not "sanction" 8 the use of such evi-
dence because otherwise the fourth amendment would be "of no
value"19 and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution."40 This
distinction is significant because, if the fourth amendment does not
prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence, then an act of Congress
authorizing such use might constitutionally supersede the judicial rule
of exclusion."1
The final important aspect of the Weeks decision is that the Su-
preme Court for the first time drew a distinction between search and
seizure by state officers and search and seizure by federal agents. Be-
cause the fourth amendment applies to federal action, the Court said
only the search and seizure by the United States Marshal violated the
Constitution, rendering the articles he seized inadmissible in evidence.
As to the articles seized by city police, the Court said that "it does not
appear that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as
would make the Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures
.... What remedies the defendant may have against them we need
not inquire ... ."42'
The Court in Weeks resolved the apparent contradiction between
Boyd and Adams. Articles seized in an unreasonable search and
seizure by federal officers cannot be introduced in evidence at a federal
criminal trial if timely application is made for their return. This is
35. 232 U.S. at 394-96.
36. See p. 233 supra
37. See p. 231 supra.
38. 232 U.S. at 394.
39. Id. at 393.
40. Ibid.
41. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
42. 232 U.S. at 398.
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a rule of judicial implication rather than a command of the fourth
amendment, and is not applicable to material seized by state officers
since their action is not in violation of defendant's federal constitu-
tional rights.'4
43. There was, however, one issue apparently decided in Boyd and rejected in
Adams which was not resolved in Weeks: Does the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment bar the receipt in evidence of articles obtained by federal officers
in violation of the fourth amendment? It was not necessary to decide this ques-
tion in Weeks since the Court concluded that such evidence should be excluded,
without regard to the fifth amendment, in order to give effect to the fourth amend-
ment. For that matter, if Weeks were to remain the law, no future case need
decide the issue either. Nevertheless, the issue was decided seven short years
later. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), both decided on the same day by unanimous Courts,
it was held that where government agents are guilty of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the articles obtained thereby cannot subsequently be received in evidence
without violating the fifth amendments self-incrimination clause. Relying on
Boyd in both cases, the Court held that in such a situation a defendant is in prac-
tical effect the "unwilling source of evidence" illegally seized and that therefore
he is being "compelled in [a] criminal case to be a witness against himself." 255
U.S. at 306.
The result reached in Gouled and Amos is open to criticism. It is clear that
the question decided in the two cases was a question significantly different from
the one decided in Boyd. The defendant in the Boyd ease was himself compelled
by statute to bring into court incriminatory matter. Thus, he was, in the express
words of the fifth amendment, "being compelled in [a] criminal case to be a
witness against himself." In Gouled and Amos, however, defendants were not
themselves compelled to produce incriminatory material; it was the Government
which produced the articles put in evidence at trial. It would seem, therefore,
that there was no violation of the fifth amendment. That amendment is designed
primarily to prevent inquisitorial practices. See Note, 31 Yale L.J. 518, 522
(1922). It prohibits the federal government from wrenching from an accused
information to be used at trial against him. The defendant, as in Boyd, is active
in that he himself is the one who furnishes the information which is used against
him. See Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 11, 14 (1925). This distinguishes a fifth
amendment invasion from a violation of the fourth amendment, where the indi-
vidual is passive and it is the government which actively and arbitrarily invades
the individual's home and person and seizes incriminatory articles. Indeed, if the
use at trial of illegally seized evidence can truly be said to compel a person to be
a witness against himself, then the use of all evidence seized from a person with-
out his consent, whether it be obtained by an illegal search and seizure or by a
legal one and whether it can be obtained by an agent of the federal government
or by a private individual, could, with equal validity, be said to be compelling a
person to be a witness against himself. But it is clear that articles obtained by
a reasonable search and seizure (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950))
or by a private person (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921)) can be ad-
mitted in evidence without violating the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause. Mr. Justice Holmes put the matter succinctly and accurately when he
said: "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its produe-
tion." Johnson v. United State, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
C. 'The Affirnation-Center, Byars, and FeldmanThe dichotomy established in Weeks between the use in federal
court of evidence illegally seized by federal officers and evidence ille-
gally seized by state officers received affirmation in later decisions.
In Center v. United States,4" city police officers from Greenville, South
Carolina, arrested defendant in his car and seized whiskey which they
found inside. The police had neither a search nor arrest warrant and
acted solely upon the basis of an unsubstantiated tip that Center was
transporting liquor illegally. Center was subsequently tried in federal
court for the unlawful possession and transportation of liquor in vio-
lation of the National Prohibition Act. At trial the two policemen who
participated in the search were permitted to testify that they found
whiskey in Center's car.'5 On appeal from his conviction, 48 Center con-
tended in the Supreme Court that the fourth amendment applied to
"all officers" and not just to federal officers," 7 and therefore prohibited
the officers from testifying to what they found in the car because this
testimony was a product of an illegal search. The Government con-
tended that since there was clearly no federal participation in the
search, the testimony was admissible even though derived from a
wrongful search and seizure.' 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of conviction in a per curiam decision. It relied on Burdeau v.
McDowell,49 a case which was not precisely in point because it held
only that evidence wrongfully taken by a private person is admissible
in federal court. The Court apparently believed that the absence of
state action in Burdeau was without significance." In any event, the
decision in Center is a square holding that evidence wrongfully seized
by state officers is admissible in federal court.
In Byars v. United States,51 an Iowa county judge issued a search
warrant, concededly insufficient when tested by federal standards,
authorizing the search of Byars' home for intoxicating liquor. Four
44. 267 U.S. 575 (1925).
45. The whiskey itself was not put in evidence because it had previously been
destroyed by state authorities.
46. The facts of this case can be found in the briefs and transcript of record
filed with the Supreme Court. Center v. United States, 267 U.S. 575 (1925). See
also Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927), where some of the facts
are stated. There is no reported district court opinion in the case.
47. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, pp. 21-22, Center v. United States, 267 U.S.
575 (1925).
48. Brief for the United States, pp. 1-4, Center v. United States, 267 U.S. 575
(1925).
49. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
50. The significance of whether the search was by a state officer, as distin-
guished from a private person, was not readily apparent until the decision in
Wolf v. Colbrado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See pp. 241-42 infra.
51. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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Iowa police officers, accompanied by a federal prohibition agent, exe-
cuted the warrant and seized incriminatory articles found in the
home. Byars was subsequently indicted and tried in federal court for
violation of prohibition laws, and the articles seized were admitted
in evidence over his objection. Byars was convicted, and after the
court of appeals affirmed,'5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. - 3
The sole issue presented was whether the search, admittedly illegal
under federal standards, was state or federal. Recognizing the thrust
of the Weeks decision, both parties agreed that the fruits of the search
were admissible if a state search were involved and inadmissible if
there had been a federal search.-5 The Court held unanimously that
there had been a federal search and reversed the judgment of con-
viction. It agreed with the premise of counsel, however, by saying:
"We do not question the right of the federal government to avail itself
of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon
their own account" 55 Thus, there can be little doubt that the Court
would have affirmed the conviction had it found that the search and
seizure was solely a state enterprise."
In Feldman v. United States,57 the question presented for decision
was whether incriminatory testimony elicited from Feldman in a state
proceeding under a state immunity statute could be admitted in evi-
dence against him in a subsequent federal criminal case without vio-
lating the fifth amendment. In a four-to-three decision, the Court
held it could. Although dealing directly with the fifth amendment, the
reasoning of the Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Frankfurter,
relies heavily upon fourth amendment cases and, more particularly,
upon the premise that evidence illegally seized by state officers can be
used in a federal court. Justice Frankfurter began by quoting with
approval the statement in the Boyd case that there is an intimate rela-
tion between the fourth and fifth amendments and that there is no
substantial difference between the use in evidence of articles obtained
52. 4 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1925).
53. 268 U.S. 684 (1925).
54. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 6-7, 13-18, Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28 (1927); Brief for the United States, pp. 7-24, Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927).
55. 273 U.S. at 33.
56. In Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), the Court logically
extended the rule of the Byars case that evidence illegally seized by state and fed-
eral agents acting together is inadmissible in federal court by holding that evi-
dence illegally seized by the state officers only, but seized solely for the purpose of
aiding a federal prosecution, is also inadmissible in federal court The holding in
Weeks that evidence illegall" seized by the city police is admissible in federal court
was distinguished upon the basis that the search was for the purpose of enforcing
state-not federal-law.
57. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
by an unreasonable search and seizure and compelling a man to be
a witness against himself.58 The Justice then pointed out that the
fourth amendment is applicable only to federal action and that, al-
though evidence illegally obtained by federal officers is inadmissible
in a federal court, evidence illegally seized by state agents can be
admitted.2 Since the fourth and fifth amendments are intimately
related, the same set of rules should apply in the fifth amendment
area. Thus, evidence obtained through testimonial compulsion by
federal officers should not be admissible in a federal court, while such
evidence obtained by state officers should be admissible. Accordingly,
the Court affirmed the conviction because Feldman's testimony was
elicited solely by state officers.6o
It is noteworthy that Justice Frankfurter's statement that "in-
criminating documents ... secured by state officials [in an illegal
search and seizure] without participation by federal officials but
turned over for their use are admissible in a federal prosecution"' 1
was crucial to the decision. If that proposition were not correct, then
the Court's analogy between the fourth and fifth amendments would
be incomplete, and its rationale invalid. Feldman, then, like Weeks,
Center, and Byars, is strong support for the view that evidence ille-
58. The Cobrt quoted with apiproval the following statement in Boyd:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments.
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and
seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for
the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
"in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "un-
reasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.
Id. at 490; Boydv. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885).
59. 322 U.S. at 492. The Court cites Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921), as support for the statement that evidence illegally seized by state agents
is admissible in federal courts, but, as previously noted (see p. 236 supra), that
case stands only for the proposition that evidence wrongfully taken by a private
person is admissible in federal court. No state action was involved in the Burdeau
case.
60. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Rutledge, dissented,
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (1944). The basis of the dissent was
that the plain meaning of the words of the fifth amendment prohibited the use of
Feldman's testimony in a federal criminal case. Clearly, Feldman had been "com-
pelled in [a] Criminal Case to be a witness against himself." It is no answer to
say that the original compulsion took place in a state proceeding; the fifth amend-
ment prohibits convictions in federal court based upon self-incriminatory testi-
mony which has been extracted by anyone against defendant's will.
61. 322 U.S. at 492.
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gaily seized by state agents is admissible in federal court,'2 and it
is certain that the Court, at the times these four cases were decided,
was for affirmance of federal judgments of conviction based upon the
use of evidence illegally seized by state agents.
D. The Renunciation-Wolf and Lustig
Any certainty produced by the decisions in Weeks, Center, Byars,
and Feldman was soon dispelled by a series of events commencing on
Sunday, March 10, 1946. On that day, New Jersey policemen illegally
searched the hotel room of Emil Lustig, alias Dr. Edward E. Fischer,
and discovered various articles used in counterfeiting operations. The
state police notified the federal agent who had supplied the police
with the information which led to the search, and he proceeded to the
hotel room where he selected those articles which were used in a
subsequent federal counterfeiting prosecution. Lustig was convicted
and the court of appeals affirmed.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court during the October,
1947, Term of Court. As in Byars, the parties based their arguments
on the question whether the search was federal or state. Lustig main-
tained that there was federal participation,"- while the Government,
62. While the per curiam decision in Center is precisely in point, it could be
argued that none of the other three decisions constitutes a square holding on the
issue because in none of them did the Court affirm a judgment of conviction
founded upon evidence illegally seized by state officers. See Patterson, Men and
Ideas of the Law 310-15 (1st ed. 1953); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis,
14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928). On the other hand, in all three cases the statement
indicating that such evidence is admissible in federal court is logically a part of
the major premise upon which the results reached depended, and therefore it could
be said they all are holdings on the question. See Patterson, op cit. supra at 313,
where the following statement is made: "A dictum is a statement of law in the
opinion which could not logically, on the facts found, be a major premise for the
selected facts and the decision." In any event, it seems certain that the Court,
at the times Weeks, Byars, and Feldman were decided, would have affirmed federal
judgments of conviction based upon the use of evidence illegally seized by state
agents.
63. 159 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1947). A petition for rehearing was denied on March
21, 1947, and on April 19, 1947, Mr. Justice Burton extended the time for filing
a petition for writ of certiorari to May 19, 1947. Transcript of Record, p. 109,
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). The petition was filed on May 19,
(Id. at front cover of Transcript of Record), and on June 16, 1947, the Court
denied certiorari. 331 U.S. 853 (1947). However, on July 5, 1947, and January
28, 1948, petitioner submitted letters to the Court concerning his'case, and on
February 16, 1948, the Court, treating the letters as a petition for rehearing,
granted a rehearing, vacated the order denying certiorari, and granted the
petition for writ of certiorari. 333 U.S. 835 (1948).
64. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-12, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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conceding that the search was illegal if tested by the standards of the
fourth amendment, urged that it was solely a state enterprise.65
Before decision, the Court, on April 26, 1948, granted certiorari
in Wolf v. Colorado.6 The question presented in Wolf was whether
evidence obtained by state police under circumstances which would
amount to an unreasonable search and seizure if tested by the standard
applicable to federal agents under the fourth amendment could be
used in a state court without violating the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. If the Court answered the question in the
negative, the consequences for the Lustig case would be obvious. If it
violated fourteenth amendment due process to use evidence seized
illegally by state officers in a state prosecution, fifth amendment due
process would very likely bar use of such evidence in a federal prose-
cution. Accordingly, on June 21, 1948, the Court entered the follow-
ing order in the Lustig case :67
This case is ordered restored to the docket and assigned for
reargument. Counsel are requested to discuss in their briefs and
on oral argument the relevance of the legality of the search and
seizure. See Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, Nos. 593-
594, October Term, 1947, 333 U.S. 879.... This case is trans-
ferred to the summary docket and assigned for hearing imme-
diately following those cases.
Since the search was admittedly illegal when tested by the standard
of the fourth amendment, the Court was apparently inquiring whether
the evidence was admissible in federal court even though it was ob-
tained solely by state officers. Thus, the grant of certiorari in Wolf
and the order for reargument in Lustig had opened, at least for the
moment, the question which Weeks, Center, Byars, and Feldman had
apparently settled.
In his brief on reargument, Lustig conceded that Weeks permitted
the use in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officers,
and asked the Court to overrule that part of the decisionB The
Government submitted a detailed fifty page brief contending that
Weeks had properly distinguished between evidence illegally seized
by federal officers and that seized by state officers and that subsequent
decisions had affirmed this distinction.69 Moreover, there was "no
reason in law or in policy'"o not to admit evidence illegally seized by
65. Brief for the United States, passim, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949).
66. 333 U.S. 879 (1948).
67. 68 Sup. Ct. 1518 (1948).
68. Brief for Petitioner on Reargument, pp. 2-7, Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949).
69. Brief for the United States on Reargument, pp. 10-18, Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
70. Id. at 20.
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state officials, for if there is no federal participation in the illegal
search and seizure, then the Government has done nothing illegal or
unethical for which it deserves punishment.71 Nor could it be fairly
argued, said the Government, that exclusion would deter future vio-
lations because the federal government has no control over state
action. ,2
On June 27, 1949, the Court handed down its decisions in Wolf'
and Lustig.74 Speaking for a majority of the Court in Wolf, Justice
Frankfurter noted approval of prior decisions holding that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate all
of the provisions of the first eight amendments to the Constitution,
but only those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'' 5 It was
held that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the "core" of the
fourth amendment and that state police therefore act unconstitution-
ally when they seize evidence under circumstances which would
amount to an illegal search by federal agents.7 6 But the opinion went
on to point out that the Weeks decision, which held that evidence ob-
tained unlawfully by federal officers was inadmissible in a federal
court, was not based upon the compulsions of the fourth amendment
itself, but rather on a judicially created rule of exclusion. The Court
concluded that this rule of exclusion was not "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." The State of Colorado, therefore, did not
violate the due process clause by using evidence unconstitutionally
seized by its state officers." Justice Black concurred in the result.78
Although adhering to his view that the entire bill of rights, including
the fourth amendment, is incorporated into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment,79 he agreed that the fourth amendment
did not of itself prohibit the use in federal court of evidence illegally
71. Id. at 26-49.
72. Id. at 21-25.
73. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
74. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
75. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325- (1937).
76. 338 U.S. at 28. Since only the "core" of the fourth amendment is incor-
porated into the fourteenth, conceivably theri may be some acts which violate
the fourth amendment when carried out by federal officers but which do not
amount to a violation of due process when carried out by state officers.
77. The Court stated that a state may rely on othe- methods of enforcing the
fourteenth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The other methods suggested by the Court wire a common law action for damages
by the aggrieved party against the police officers who took part in the illegal
search, prosecution of the officers by the state, or possible contempt of court ac-
tion. But see note 127, infra.
78. 838 U.S. at 39.- •
79. See Adamson v. California, 3.32 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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seized by federal officers. He therefore was of the opinion that the
states could use evidence illegally seized by state officers.'0
The most significant aspect of the Wolf decision is its holding that
because the core of the fourth amendment is incorporated into the
fourteenth, it is unconstitutional for state officers to search for and
seize evidence in a manner which would violate the standard ap-
plicable to federal officers under the fourth amendment. What effect
would this holding have on a case involving the use in federal court
of evidence unlawfully obtained solely by state officers? This ques-
tion might have been answered in Lustig ha-l the Court found that
the search and-seizure there had been entirely a state enterprise.
But Lustig did not answer the question. In fact, a majority of the
Court was able to agree on only one thing-that the judgment of the
court of appeals should be reversed. None of the three opinions filed
could command a majority. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, delivered the Court's judgment in an
opinion which expressed the view that there was federal partici-
pation in the search and therefore, under Weeks and Byars, the
80. Three dissenting opinions were filed.' Justice Douglas dissented upon the
basis that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment and the rule of exclusion prohibiting the use of illegally seized evi-
dence is also applicable to the states in order to give "effective sanction" to the
amendment. 338 U.S. at 40. Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, dis-
sented upon the same basis and stated that he regarded as ineffective the other
remedies that the Court suggested might be pursued by the states in order to
enforce the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, also wrote a dissenting
opinion. He took the position that the fourth amendment itself prohibits the use
in federal court of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure and
this ban should be applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The view of Justice Rutledge that the fourth amendment
itself prohibits the use in federal court of illegally seized evidence, although
adopted in Boyd (see p. 231 supra), was rejected in Weeks (see p. 234 supra).
It was not even argued to the Court that the fifth amendment's self-incrimina-
tion clause prohibits the use of illegally seized evidence and that this prohibition
is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In Boyd, it was
suggested that the self-incrimination'clause prohibits the use in federal court of
evidence illegally .seized by federal officers, and that suggestion was later adopted
in two Supreme Court decisions. See note 43 supra. Of course, even had this
view been put forward in Wolf, One Court perhaps would till have affirmed the
judgment of the Supreme Court" of Colorado either by rejecting the validity of
this view (see note 43 supra) or by holding that, assuming such a position is
tenable, still the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate that part of the
fifth amendment which prohibits the use of such evidence. Cf. Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). However, Justice Black, who concurred in Wolf, could
not have accepted the latter alternative since his view is that the fourteenth
amendment incorporates the entirety of the first eight amendments. Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S.' 46, 68 (dissenting opinion).
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fruits of the search were inadmissible in a federal court. Thus, it
was "not necessary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted entirely by State officers."s l
Justice Black merely noted that he concurred in the judgment of
reversal for "substantially" the same reasons expressed in his dis-
senting opinion in the Feldman case.2 And Justice Murphy, joined by
Justices Douglas and Rutledge, stated cryptically that, in accord with
his dissenting opinion in Wolf, illegally seized evidence should be in-
admissible in any court regardless of whether the illegal search was
conducted by federal or state officers.2' Although the opinion is not
explicit all three Justices apparently agreed that the use of such evi-
dence would violate fifth amendment due process since in Wolf they
all expressed the belief that the use of such evidence in a state pro-
ceeding violated fourteenth amendment due process." At the very
least, they would undoubtedly be willing to hold that articles illegally
seized by state officers should be subject to a judicial rule of exclusion
in the federal court.
Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Jackson
and Burton, dissented, saying that there was no federal participation
in the search and therefore the articles seized were admissible.85 The
dissenters apparently did not believe that the Wolf decision should
undermine the earlier holdings in Weeks, Center, Byars, and Feldma2
that evidence illegally seized by state officers is admissible in a federal
court.
What effect did Wolf have upon the basic legal question in Lustig-
the admissibility in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state
officers? First of all, because Wolf held that the constitutionality of a
search and seizure conducted by state officers rests upon the federal
law of search and seizure applicable to federal officers under the
fourth amendment, it is clear that the state law on search and seizure
is immaterial to the validity of the search for the purpose of deter-
mining the admissibility of its fruits in federal court.8 6 Second, the
81. 338 U.S. at 79.
82. Id. at 80. In Feldman, Justice Black took the position that the plain mean-
ing of the words of the fifth amendment prohibits the federal government from
using in a federal criminal case testimony previously elicited involuntarily from
a person in a state proceeding under a state immunity statute. See note 60 supra.
In Lustig, his position probably was that the plain meaning of the words of the
fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, whether carried
out by state or federal officers, and that all evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment should be subject to a judicial rule of exclusion.
83. 338 U.S. at 80.
84. See note 80 supra.
85. 338 U.S. at 80 (dissenting'opinion).
86. The United States took the position that the legality of the search under
state law is immaterial in its briefs in Byars and Lustig. See Brief for the
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holding that the fourteenth amendment, by incorporating the fourth
amendment, renders unconstitutional those searches and seizures by
state officers which fall below the federal standard severely undercuts
the basis for the holdings in Weeks,17 Center,/- Byars, 9 and Feld-
m7an 90 that evidence improperly seized by state officers is admissible
in federal court. Until Wolf, the only inquiry made by the Court
when it considered an admittedly illegal search was whether or not
the search had been conducted by federal officers. If it was not a
federal search, then the Federal Constitution was not violated and
the evidence seized was admissible. After the Wolf decision, however,
the Federal Constitution is infringed even by a state search and there
remains unanswered the serious question whether evidence seized by
an unconstitutional state search is admissible in federal court. Rea-
lizing this implication of Wolf, the Court in Lustig could no longer
repeat what had been said in Byars that it did "not question the right
of the federal government to avail itself of [such] evidence. ' 'B1 In-
stead, Justice Frankfurter carefully stated merely that "it is not
necessary to consider what would be the result if the search had been
conducted entirely by State officers."' '
II. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSuE-AN EVALUATION
A. In Generc
How shduld the Supreme Court decide the question of admissibility
in federal court of evidence obtained by state officers in an illegal
search and seizure ? 3 Those who espouse the general view that all
United States, p. 27, Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Brief for the
United States, Lustig v. United States, p. 19, n.4, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
87. See text supported by note 42 supra.
88. See text supported by notes 47-50 supra.
89. See text supported by note 55 supra.
90. See text supported by notes 57-61 supra.
91. 273 U.S. at 33.
92. 338 U.S. at 79.
93. Some selected readings on the more general problem of use in court of
illegally obtained evidence are: In favor of admitting illegally obtained evidence:
8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2183-84 (3d ed. 1940). Wood & Waite, Crime and Its
Treatment 390-94 (1941) ; Grant, Search and Seizure in California, 15 So. Calif. L.
Rev. 131- (1942); Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. Calif.
L. Rev. 359 (1941); Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19
Ill. L. Rev. 303 (1925); Knox, Self-Incrimination, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 139 (1925);
Plumb Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 370-75 (1939);
Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 679 (1944).
In favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence: McCormick, Evidence 291
(1954); Cornelius, Search and Seizure 2 (2d ed. 1930); Machen, The Law of
Search and Seizure (1950); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federal-
ism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1950); Atkinson, Admissibility
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illegally seized articles should be admitted in evidence rely on the
tenet that admissibility should be predicated exclusively upon con-
siderations of reliability and relevance. 91 Once it is determined that
illegally seized evidence is both reliable and relevant, there is no
reason for its exclusion. Moreover, it is argued, for courts to exclude
such evidence frequently will enable the guilty to go free, thereby
fostering the criminal element in society instead of helping the police
to eliminate it."
Those who would exclude all illegally seized evidence reply that the
law of evidence is not guided solely by considerations of reliability
and relevancy but often is guided by overriding considerations of
public policy. Two policy considerations are put forward as reasons
for excluding illegally seized evidence. 9 First, it is contended that
exclusion preserves and protects the integrity of the court. The in-
dividual's freedom from unauthorized governmental invasion of his
property was considered so worthy of protection by the founding
fathers that they engraved it in constitutional bedrock. The courts,
as well as the police, have a duty to protect his freedom, and this
should be done in part by disqualifying evidence obtained illegally.
Second, it is argued that exclusion of illegally seized evidence will
deter future illegal action by the police. If the police know that
of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 Colum.
L. Rev. 11 (1925); Beisel, Control over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law:
Role of the Supreme Court, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 413 (1954); Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954); Chaffee, The
Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 694-704 (1922); Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 191 (1930); Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through
Illegal Searches and Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 5 Vand. L.
Rev. 523 (1952); Farrelly, Searches and Seizures During the Truman Era, 25
So. Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1951); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law
of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa L. Rev. 472 (1948); Comment, 47 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 493 (1952); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 144 (1948).
94. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2175, 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
95. 8 id. § 2183.
96. See, e.g., Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). It has been suggested that there
are two other reasons for a rule of exclusion: (1). ,exclusion gives a remedy to
the victim; (2) exclusion punishes the prosecution for .its own misconduct. Com-
ment, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1159, 1165-67 (1957). The :first suggested basis is not
an adequate reason for exclusion, for exclusion almost always gives a remedy
only to the guilty and not to the innocent. A sound basis for exclusion should not
discriminate in favor of those whom the illegal search reveals to be guilty of a
crime and against those who have done no wrong. The second suggested.basis
has no application to cases in which evidence illegally seized by state officers is
offered in evidence in federal court by the United States Attorney. The-'federal
government was not the perpetrator of the illegal search and should not be pun-
ished for something it did not do.
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articles they have improperly seized are inadmissible in court, they
will be careful to avoid such illegal activity because of their interest
in obtaining convictions. The validity of these two reasons for ex-
cluding tainted evidence and their applicability to the immediate prob-
lem at hand-use in federal court of evidence illegally obtained by
state police-warrant detailed examination.
B. Judiei Integrity
Since Wolf it has been clear that evidence obtained by state agents
in an illegal search and seizure is not only illegally seized evidence
but also unconstitutionally seized evidence. If such evidence is used
in federal court, is there a violation of judicial integrity; that is, is
the court acting immorally and corruptly? The view that judicial
integrity does call for the exclusion of tainted evidence finds support
from opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis and from statements
in recent court opinions. The gist of Justice Holmes' argument for
exclusion is that "if the search and seizure are unlawful as invading
personal rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be in-
fringed yet further if the evidence was allowed to be used."17 In Olin-
stead v. United States, he stated his position more fully as follows:"8
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end
that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that
the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes,
when they are the'means by which the evidence is to be obtained.
.. We have to choose, and for my part, I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part.
For those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken
between the government as prosecutor and the government asjudge. If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to
have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge
to allow such iniquities to succeed....
In the same case, Justice Brandeis said:"
When these unlawful acts were committed, they were crimes
only of the officers individually. The government was innocent,
in legal contemplation; for no federal official is authorized to
commit a crime on its behalf. When the government, having full
knowledge, sought, through the Department of Justice, to avail
itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own
ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the officers' crimes.
... [A]nd if this court should permit the government, by means
of its officers' crimes, to effect its purpose of punishing the de-
fendants, there would seem to be present all the elements of a
ratification. If so, the government itself would be a lawbreaker.
97. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926).
98. 277 U.S. 438, 469-70 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
99. Id. at 483 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss3/1
ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE
Will this court by sustaining the judgment below sanction such
conduct on the part of the executive?
More recently, in McNabb v. United States,1 °0 the Supreme Court held
that a confession obtained by federal officers during a period of illegal
detention is inadmissible in federal court. One basis of the Court's
decision, as expressed by Justice Frankfurter, was :101
[A] conviction resting on evidence secured through such a fla-
grant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded
cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of the law.
It has been argued that the exclusionary rule may lead to the release
of the guilty'02 but this argument has been answered by the observa-
tion that it amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the ends
justify the means.10 3 Moreover, if the police had obeyed the law in the
first instance and had not committed the illegal search and seizure,
there would be no evidence upon which to base a prosecution and con-
viction. 0 1 Thus, suppression of the tainted evidence merely returns
affairs to the status quo existing prior to the unlawful police intru-
sion; it does not prevent a conviction which would have occurred had
the police acted legally.
On the other side of the argument, it is well to point out initially
that a majority of the states in this country-twenty-seven in all103-
do not follow the Weeks rule excluding illegally obtained evidence.
Then, too, the English Commonwealth jurisdictions have been ad-
mitting illegally obtained evidence literally for centuries' and these
courts must all be credited with having as fine a sense of integrity as
the excluding courts of this country. An excellent judicial expression
against the rule of exclusion has come from Justice Cardozo, a man
of the most delicate sensibilities. While sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, he viewed the moral question this way :07
100. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
101. 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
102. See, e.g., 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184 (3d ed. 1940); Plumb, Illegal En-
forcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 370-71 (1939); Waite, Police Regula-
tion by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 679, 682-83 (1944).
103. Note, 58 Yale L. J. 144, 161 (1948). See also Douglas, The Means and
the End, 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 103.
104. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955).
105. For the latest compilation of states admitting and rejecting illegally seized
evidence, see Annot, 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
106. Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 State Tr. 323, 496, 629-30 (1723); The
Queen v. Granatelli, 7 State Tr. (n.s.) 979, 987 (1849). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2183 (3d ed. 1940) ; Cowen, op. cit. supra note 93, at 528-31.
107. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).
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We are confirmed in this conclusion [that the law of New York
does not demand the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence]
when we reflect how far-reaching in its effect upon society the
new consequences would be. The pettiest peace officer would
have it in his power, through overzeal or indiscretion, to confer
immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A
room is searched against. the law, and the body of a murdered
man is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the
other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant
with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed, and
the murderer goes free. Another search, once more against the
law, discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery.
The absence of a warrant means the freedom of the forger. Like
instances can be multiplied. We may not subject society to these
dangers until the Legislature has spoken with a clearer voice.
Thus, the argument rejecting the idea that judicial integrity demands
exclusion of tainted evidence emphasizes the possible undesirable re-
suI t-criminals freed and crimes unpunished.o8
108. Among the legal writers, Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., has rejected
the notion that judicial integrity calls for-the exclusion of tainted evidence with
the following observation:
These moralistic notions, however, would seem to add little weight to the
exclusionary rule. Is not -the court which excludes illegally obtained evidence
in order to avoid condoning the acts of the officers by the same token con-
doning the illegal acts of the defendant? Suppose a policeman by an illegal
search has obtained evidence which establishes the defendant as a peddler
of narcotics to juveniles. Where lies the duty of the judge? Can we assume
from any social point of view that the policeman's conduct is so much more
reprehensible than the defendant's, that the duty of the judge is to reject the
evidence and free the defendant?
Law enforcement is not a game in which liberty triumphs whenever the
policeman is defeated. Liberty demands that both officials and private law-
lessness shall be curbed. And in any specific instance it is hard to say that,
put to the choice between permitting the consummation of the defendant's
illegal scheme and the policeman's illegal scheme, the court must of neces-
sity favor the defendant. So to say is to abandon any presumption of official
regularity and to assume that the policeman's action always involves a
greater social evil than the defendant's. It should be noted that the exclusion
of the evidence usually results in the defendant's completely escaping pun-
ishment for his act, while the admission of the evidence does not constitute
a judicial approval of the officer's conduct, and that officer is still, at least
in theory, subject to some form of civil or criminal liability.
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment on
People v. Cahan, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565, 582 (1955). Professor Wigmore has
summed up the views of those opposed to an exclusionary rule as follows:
All this [the rule of exclusion] is misguided sentimentality. For the sake
of indirectly and contingently protecting the Fourth Amendment, this view
appears indifferent to the direct and immediate result, viz., of making Jus-
tice inefficient, and of coddling the law-evading classes of the population. It
puts the Supreme Court in the position of assisting to undermine the foun-
dations of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the
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It can be seen that both views may be stated persuasively. But,
more important, both views demonstrate that the problem involves the
reconciliation of the principle of protection of the individual and the
principle of protection of society. A value judgment must be made.
The proponents of the exclusionary rule have judged that protection
of the individual against unreasonable searches and seizures is the
more important consideration, while those who would admit tainted
evidence believe that elimination of the criminal element from society
is more important. The problem of integrity then is the problem of
choice between the lesser of two evils-the evil of permitting criminals
to go free and the evil of condoning illegal acts by policemen who
infringe individual liberties. Whichever choice is made, one evil is
being tolerated and the other condemned.
One intermediate view is that proper weighing of the interests of
society and individual should lead to different results depending on
the circumstances of each case. Thus, in cases in which the illegal act
of the policeman is inadvertent or slight, the offense heinous and diffi-
cult to detect, and all other factors indicate that use of the tainted
evidence would not be unduly unfair to the defendant, 0 9 it does not
seem amiss to suggest that the moral view, if there be one, is to over-
look the illegal police action, admit the evidence, and punish the crim-
inal. On the other hand, if the policeman's act is in bad faith, the
offense is not morally revolting, and all other factors indicate that the
admission of the evidence would be unfair to the defendant, then it
is better to exclude rather than to admit the evidence. Such a case by
case approach to the problem would be somewhat analogous to the
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California,10
which held that evidence obtained by state officers by conduct which
is so unfair that it "shocks the conscience"1 1 is inadmissible in state
court. Thus, although in accordance with the holding in Wolf,12 states
normally may admit illegally seized evidence, such evidence cannot be
admitted when its use would be so fundamentally unfair that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment would be violated. In the
situation where evidence illegally seized by state officers is offered in
federal court, the court, in determining whether such evidence should
be admitted, would exclude not only evidence obtained by methods
overzealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than
the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
109. See text supported by notes 117-23 infra.
110. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
111. Id. at 172.
112. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See text supported by notes 75-80 supra.
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which shock the conscience but also evidence which, all circumstances
considered, it would be unfair to admit. This latter decision in favor
of exclusion would be on a different level than exclusion under the
Rochin decision. It would not be a constitutional question whether the
evidence should be excluded; rather, the question would be whether
or not evidence seized under circumstances which do not shock the
conscience should nonetheless be excluded under a judicial rule of
exclusion because it would be unfair to admit it.
Such a case by case analysis of the problem of use of tainted evi-
dence has recently been adopted in Scotland. Although the law in
Scotland, as in other British Commonwealth jurisdictions, had been
that relevant evidence should be admitted regardless of its source, in
1949 and 1950 the Sdottish High Court of Justiciary adopted a new
approach. In Lawrie v. Muir"' and McGovern v. H. M. Advocate,'
the court held illegally seized evidence inadmissible. Recognizing that
the problem was one of reconciliation between the conflicting interests
of citizen and society, the court said that neither should be "insisted
upon to the uttermost." 1" 5 The correct rule, the court held, was that
"an irregularity in the obtaining of evidence does not necessarily
make that evidence inadmissible. 116 It added:
Whether any given irregularity ought to be excused depends
upon the nature of the irregularity and the circumstances under
which it was committed. In particular, the case may bring into
play the discretionary principle of fairness to the accused which
has been developed so fully in our law in relation to the admission
in evidence of confessions or admissions by a person suspected
or charged with crime. That principle would obviously require
consideration in any case in which the departure from the strict
procedure had been adopted deliberately with a view to securing
the admission of evidence obtained by an unfair trick.... On the
other hand, to take an extreme instance figured in argument, it
,would usually be wrong to exclude some highly incriminatory
production in a murder trial merely because it was found by a
police officer in the course of a search authorised for a different
purpose or before a proper warrant had been obtained.2 7
In Lawrie, the court held that the balance was tipped in favor of
exclusion because the persons who made the illegal search were special
inspectors who "ought to know the precise limits of their authority
and should be held to exceed these limits at their peril." 18 They were
not ordinary police officers who enjoy "a large residuum of common
113. [1950] Scots L.T.R. 37 (1949).
114. [1950] Scots L.T.R. 133.
115. Lawrie v. Muir, [1950] Scots L.T.R. 37, 40 (1949).
116. Ibid. (Emphasis in the originaL)
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
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law discretionary powers.""' In the McGovern case, the evidence was
excluded mainly because its use would have denied the defendant a
"fair trial"120 and because it was obtained by police in an irregular
manner and under circumstances in which "it would have been very
simple for the police to have adopted the appropriate procedure in
relation to a search of his [defendant's] person."1 2' In a more recent
case, Fairly v. Fishmongers of the City of London,222 evidence illegally
seized was held admissible because the court found "nothing to sug-
gest that any departure from the strict procedure was deliberately
adopted with a view to securing the admission of evidence obtained
by an unfair trick." 23
The Scottish cases take a realistic approach to the question of
integrity involved in the admission of tainted evidence because they
recognize the fact that a proper weighing of the interest of society
against the interest of the individual may lead to different results
under different circumstances. It is doubtful, however, that such a
case by case analysis provides the certainty that is needed in this
area. The determination in each case tends to leave too much to the
visceral reaction of the judge.'2 4 The Supreme Court itself would
have to give each case its individual consideration since the judges in
lower courts, without a clearly ascertainable standard, might be prone
to make varying judgments. An absolute prohibition or acceptance,
by providing certainty, would be a more practical guide to the police
than an amorphous standard dependent on all the circumstances of
each case. It is desirable that the police, federal and state, know the
exact consequences of their acts. Prosecuting attorneys also need to
know precisely what evidence is admissible and what is not.
C. Deterrence
Consideration must next be given to the question whether the
exclusion in federal court of illegally seized evidence will deter state
police officers from engaging in such improper activity. Although
courts usually base holdings excluding such evidence on reasons of
judicial integrity, recent court decisions,12 5 as well as the writings of
119. Ibid.
120. McGovern v. H.M. Advocate [1950] Scots L.T.R. 133, 135.
121. Ibid.
122. [1951] Scots L.T.R. 54 (1950).
123. Id. at 58.
124. See Comment, 21 Fordham L. Rev. 287 (1952); Comment, 50 Mich. L. Rev.
1367 (1952); Comment, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 591 (1952). But see Note, 66 Harv. L,
Rev. 122 (1952).
125. See, e.g., Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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legal scolars, 126 have given increasing recognition to deterrence as a
-basis for an exclusionary rule. 27 Unfortunately, however, there exists
no statistical proof that the general rule of exclusion adopted in the
federal courts and in many of the state courts has served the purpose
of deterring illegal searches and seizures. The most valuable study
has been conducted by Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., who analyzed
the consequences of a recent California decision which overturned
prior California law and held that evidence illegally seized is in-
admissible in state court.228 Professor Barrett found that the decision
evoked increased determination by state authorities to eliminate ille-
gal searches and seizures. Law enforcement personnel re-examined
the pertinent law, and the California Attorney General and the Dis-
trict Attorney of Los Angeles both published pamphlets designed to
give peace officers a practical guide in how properly to make a search
and seizure. Newspaper publicity gave further impetus to the police
to adopt lawful procedures which they formerly had ignored." 9
The California example illustrates that, given political morality in
the community and a tradition in the police force of respect for law,13
it is not far-fetched for courts to expect that a rule of exclusion will
help deter illegal searches. However, the question of exclusion in
federal court of state-illegally obtained evidence presents a special
problem. In particular, the Government has contended on at least
one occasion 31 that exclusion of such evidence in federal court will
not deter future illegal searches and seizures by state officers because
the federal government has no control over state action.
126. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 93, at 16-20; Barrett, supra note 108, at 583-
88; Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1159, 1164-65 (1957); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 144, 151-
52 (1948).
127. A possible reason that deterrence as a basis for an exclusionary rule has
taken on increased importance recently is the growing realization that other pos-
sible deterrents to unlawful police intrusions, short of judicial exclusion, have
proven inadequate. See Allen, supra note 93, at 17-18; Paulsen, Safeguards in
the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 65, 72 (1957). The victim of
an illegal search is unlikely to undergo the expense and uncertainties of a tort
action for damages against the police officer who conducted the illegal search.
There is also an unlikelihood that the aggrieved party will be able to obtain a
substantial judgment against the police officer who is likely to be irresponsible
financially. An action against the city or state is likely to fail because of general
rules of sovereign immunity. See Note, 58 Yale L.J. 144, 147, n.13 (1948). Crim-
inal prosecution of the police officer is likewise unlikely. Few, if any, prosecuting
attorneys would be so ungrateful ,to those who have aided them in obtaining con-
victions. See Allen, supra note 93, at 18.
128. Barrett, supra note 108, at 587-88.
129. Id. at 568-78.
130. Id. at 585-86; Allen, supra note 93, at 17.
13L See text supported by note 72 supra.
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It would seem, however, that exclusion in federal court of evidence
illegally seized by state officers would encourage the federal executive
branch to take steps to discourage such illegal activity. There is an
ever-increasing area in which federal and state crimes overlap.' 3 2 -for
example, possession and sale of narcotics, 33 certain types of em-
bezzlement,"3 sending threatening or extortive communications in
the mails," 5 fleeing from justice,36 fraud, 37 bank robbery, 3 9 kid-
napping,, 9 and illegal transportation of liquor,140 lottery tickets,"1
obscene matter,1 4 2 stolen goods, and automobiles." 3 Such overlap
naturally results in a concomitant duplication in federal and state
investigative activity. Serious impairment of federal law enforce-
ment could result if state officers, during investigation of state
crimes which overlap federal crimes, commit an illegal search and
seizure. For example, if federal and state officers are both indepen-
dently investigating the operations of a large dope ring, and a state
officer, through overzeal or ignorance, raids the central headquarters
of the ring under circumstances which would amount to an unreason-
able search and seizure, the fruits of the search would not be ad-
missible in federal court and the offenders would go free unless they
could be prosecuted in a state court. And even if the evidence could
be used in a state prosecution,'" federal officers might be unable to
round up and prosecute other members of the ring located in other
states because the illegal raid made evidence unusable which was
necessary for the successful prosecution in federal court of the other
members.
132. Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrini-
nation, 42 Cornell L.Q. 346, 348-49 (1957); Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1159, 1170
(1957).
133. 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1952), as amended
21 U.S.C.A. § 174 (Supp. 1956).
134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 153, 641 (1952).
135. 18 id. J§ 875-76
136. 18 id. § 1073.
137. 18 id. §§ 1001, 1341, 1343.
138. 18 id. j 2113.
139. 18 id. § 1201.
140. 18 id. § 1262.
141. 18 id. §§ 1301-02.
142. 18 id. §§ 1461-63.
143. 18 id. §§ 2312, 2314.
144. There are 27 states which admit illegally seized evidence. See the latest
tabulation of states in Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). Cf. Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1956), where the Supreme Court held that a federal agent who had
illegally seized incriminatory evidence could be epjoined by a federal district court
from turning the evidence over to state authorities for state prosecution and from
orally testifying in state court.
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This definite interest of the federal government in state law en-
forcement techniques would naturally incline it to encourage states
to improve their law enforcement methods. Close cooperation between
federal and state police would facilitate such encouragement and it is
notable that such cooperation has existed in the past and exists today
in an increasing degree. For example, in 1935, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation established the FBI National Academy,2' 5 which provides
law enforcement instruction for local officers throughout the United
States. This program has resulted in very close cooperation and
understanding between the FBI and many local police organizations
and might well serve as a vehicle by which the federal government
could help reduce the incidence of illegal searches and seizures by
state agents. More recently, the Department of Justice undertook a
long range program for combating crime throughout the country1' "
which has resulted in close cooperation and liaison between federal
and state police. 47 This latest program presents additional oppor-
tunities for the federal government to curb improper state police
practices in cases in which a violation of federal law may be involved.
. Close federal and state cooperation is not the only method available
to the federal government to control state investigative techniques.
A correlative method is to call to the attention of state agents the
but-rarely-invoked Civil Rights Act, which provides for the punish-
ment of anyone who "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, or custom willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution. . ."141 Willful perpetrators of an
145. Whitehead, The FBI Story 149-50 (1956). In its first 21 years of opera-
tion, over 3200 law enforcement officers received instruction on all phases of law
enforcement, including proper investigative techniques and methods. Id. at 151.
Many of these officers later obtained executive positions in their local police organ-
izations and many others returned home to instruct the other members of their
police forces. Ibid.
146. See press release of the Department of Justice, April 10, 1958. The release
states that "the liaison with local police that the FBI has established through the
National Police Academy and the FBI Laboratory" was expected "to be of aid in
cooperation in the field [of federal offenses such as the Hobbs Anti-racketeering
Act, Obstruction of Justice, Extortion, and Interstate Fraud by Wire]." The re-
lease also stated that "Herbert Wiltsee of the Council of State Governments and
Secretary of The National Association of Attorneys General has expressed inter-
est in the plan [for combating organized crime in this country] and pledged co-
operation."
147. See note 146 supra. On March 30, 1959, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
announced that the FBI will conduct special conferences with local police officials
throughout the country to coordinate the lrogram. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
March 30, 1959, p. 9A, col. 5. One such conference was held on April 15, 1959; see
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 16, 1959, p. 1A, col. 2.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
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illegal search and seizure are by this act subject to punishment by
imprisonment for one year or a $1000 fine, or both. Although it is
unlikely that the federal government would '49 or couldso enforce this
statute against local law officers except in extreme cases, the threat
of such a prosecution would help federal efforts to deter illegal state
action.
It is therefore submitted that a decision excluding in federal court
evidence illegally seized by state officers would probably help deter
future illegal activity by state officers because federal officials could
make successful use of methods available to them to discourage state
agents from engaging in illegal searches and seizures.25" At the very
least, any existing tacit, but unprovable, encouragement by federal
officers of this illegal state activity would be eliminated.
149. There have been very few prosecutions under this statute. See the appen-
dix to the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 153-54 (1954).
150. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The difficulties involved
in the enforcement of this statute are analyzed in Clark, A Federal Prosecutor
Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 175 (1947).
151. It has been suggested that the federal courts should exclude evidence
illegally seized by state officers only where the judicial policy of the state whose
officers seized the evidence is in favor of exclusion. Parsons, supra note 132, at
362-68. If a state court admits illegally seized evidence, then the federal courts
too should admit evidence illegally seized by that state's officers. Thus, in so far
as the 21 states which follow the exclusionary rule are concerned, the federal
courts would not admit evidence illegally seized by their officers but would admit
evidence illegally seized by the officers of the 27 states which do not follow the
exclusionary rule. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956), for the latest compilation
of states admitting and rejecting illegally seized evidence. The advocate of this
position suggests that reasons of comity should lead the federal court to recognize
and respect state policy that the exclusionary rule is or is not a necessary measure
for protecting the right of citizens to be free of illegal searches and seizures.
Parsons, supra note 132, at 363.
It is submitted that this view that the federal law of exclusion should follow
the state law of exclusion in regard to evidence illegally seized by state agents
cannot withstand analysis. Although the possible objection to this approach that
it would be too difficult to determine in each case whether the state involved
follows the exclusionary rule can at once be set aside as insubstantial, the decisive
objection to the approach is that it serves no purpose. All states are interested
in preventing illegal search and seizures, and while some states have implemented
that interest by an exclusionary rule and others have not, the only method by
which the federal government can show deference to that basic interest is to
exclude the tainted evidence in all cases. Other federal methods are impractical
A civil action in federal court against state officers who deprive persons of their
constitutional rights is authorized (17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952)),
but there is good cause to doubt that an aggrieved party would be willing to
undergo the uncertainties of such litigation. See note 127 supra. Prosecution by
the federal government of the state officers is also authorized, but the success of
such a prosecution is, as previously pointed out, unlikely. See text supported by
notes 149 and 150 supra. Thus, the only practical way for the federal govern-
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
CONCLUSION
Since the 1949 decisions in Wolf and Lustig, the Supreme Court has
not considered whether evidence illegally seized by state agents is
admissible in federal court."52 Courts of appeal, without careful analy-
sig 5 3 have generally adhered to the old rule that such evidence is
admissible. 54 Recently, however, in Hanna v. United States25 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that evidence
illegally seized by state officers is not admissible in federal court. The
court pointed out that the question of admissibility has been open
ment to assist states in their efforts to enforce this basic interest is to exclude
the tainted evidence. On the other hand, the admission of the illegally seized
evidence would do nothing to deter unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers. Moreover, excluding tainted evidence in no way impinges upon or frus-
trates a state rule admitting tainted evidence. Under Wolf, the state is still free
to admit illegally seized evidence and to use other methods to deter illegal police
action. An admitting state, therefore, should have no reason to resent a federal
rule excluding such evidence. It is submitted that excluding in federal court all
evidence illegally seized by state agents is not only the single practical method
available of assisting all states in enforcing their policy to prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures but also it in no way interferes with the policy of some of
the states to admit such evidence. Thus, there is no reason, state or federal, for
drawing a distinction between state jurisdictions admitting tainted evidence and
those which do not.
152. Since Wolf and Lustig, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in four
cases which have presented the issue: Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958); Fredericks v. United States, 208
F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); Serio v. United
States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
153. Cf. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Jones v.
United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954).
154. Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
830 (1958); Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 937 (1958) ; United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Collins v.
United States, 230 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. White, 228 F.2d
832 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954) ; United
States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Fredericks v. United States, 208
F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); Serio v. United
States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Parker v.
United States, 183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950); Losieau v. United States, 177 F.2d
919 (8th Cir. 1949); Shelton v.. United States, 169 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948); Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir.
1946); Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 811
(1946); Butler v. United States, 153 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1946); United States
v. Diuguid, 146 F.2d 848 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 857 (1945); Shushan
v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, rehearing
denied, 314 U.S. 706 (1941); Miller v. United States, 50 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 651 (1931); Kanellos v. United States, 282 Fed. 461 (4th Cir.
1922), overruling Dukes v. United States, 275 Fed. 142 (4th Cir. 1921).
155. 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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since Wolf, and that it therefore did not feel bound to follow an old
decision" 6 in that circuit admitting such evidence. -7 The court based
its decision both on considerations of judicial integrity and deterrence
of state officers from engaging in illegal searches and seizures. Al-
though the decision created a conflict among the circuits, the Govern-
ment did not seek review by the Supreme Court of the holding in
Hanna."6 Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Rios v. United States,"' a case which again presents the is-
sue of use in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officers.
In Rios, however, the Court may well not reach that issue since it may
decide that, under the circumstances of that case, the search by state
officers was lawfuL'"°
156. Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
834 (1948).
157. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
158. The Solicitor General of the United States has stated that the Government
did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in Hanna because it interpreted that
decision "as laying down a rule of evidence which the Court of Appeals has formu-
lated for the District of Columbia under its special supervisory powers." See
letter from J. Lee Rankin to James R. Browning, Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the United States, filed in connection with No. 40 Misc., 1958 Term, Rios v. United
States, certiorari granted on April 20, 1959, 79 Sup. Ct. 881. Although it is true
that the court of appeals decided the issue "as a matter of sound policy in the
administration of judicial proceedings in the District of Columbia," the court also
decided the question "on principle" and made it clear that it believed that "the
courts of the United States... cannot afford to play the 'ignoble part' by them-
selves permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence... " Hanna v.
United States, 260 F.2d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Court thus believed that
it was deciding the question on general principles applicable to all federal courts
and not just those applicable to federal courts in the District of Columbia.
159. 79 Sup. Ct. 881 (1959).
160. Los Angeles police officers undertook the surveillance of a taxicab in a
"problem-area" of the city. They observed Rios "approach the cab, look furtively
about, and enter." The police followed the cab in their unmarked police car, and
when the taxicab stopped at a traffic signal, one officer got out of his car, came
over to the side of the cab where Rios was seated, and identified himself as a
police officer. He then saw Rios reach into his pocket and drop an object on the
floor of the taxicab. The police officer focussed his flashlight on the object and
identified it as a transparent rubber contraceptive filled with a light colored
powder. The officer knew that it was common practice for narcotics dealers to
carry heroin by this means. At that point, Rios pushed the taxicab door out, and
at the same time, the officer pulled the door open and immediately placed Rios
under arrest "for narcotics." Rios v. -United States, 256 F.2d 173, 174-75 (9th
Cir. 1958).
It is important to note that the policeman made no arrest until he bad identified
the object on the floor of the taxicab as a package of narcotics. At that time, it
would seem that there was probable cause for an arrest without a warrant be-
cause the policeman reasonably believed that Rios illegally possessed narcotics.
It would therefore follow that the search was lawful because made incident to a
lawful arrest.
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An indication of how the Supreme Court will decide the question of
use in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officers, should
it reach that issue in Rios, was provided recently in Benanti v. United
States.' The issue in Benanti was whether evidence obtained by
state officers through the use of wiretapping, which is a federal
crime,' 6 -' is admissible in federal court. The Government argued that
wiretap evidence seized by state agents should be admissible in federal
court, by analogizing it to evidence obtained by state officers in an
unreasonable search and seizure. The Government pointed out that
although Weeks held that evidence illegally seized by federal officers
is inadmissible in federal court, Wolf held that evidence illegally
seized by state officers is admissible in state courts. It argued, more-
over, that Weeks and Byars established that evidence illegally seized
by state officers is admissible in federal court. The same set of rules
should be applicable to evidence which is the product of illegal wire-
tapping activity. Thus, although federal wiretap evidence is inad-
missible in federal court 6 3 state wiretap evidence is admissible in
state cour' 6 4 To complete the analogy, the Government contended,
the Court in Benanti should hold that state wiretap evidence is ad-
missible in federal court. To hold otherwise, the Government con-
cluded, would be to adopt an "odd concept that somehow a Constitu-
tional prohibition is to be given less dignity " 1ian a statutory one."'1o5
The Court held the evidence inadmissible. - The Government's an-
alogy was not well taken, the Court said, because of the explicit statu-
tory prohibition of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
against the interception and divulgence of the existence or contents
of a telephone conversation. It was therefore "neither necessary nor
appropriate to discuss by analogy distinctions suggested to be ap-
plicable to the Fourth Amendment."''6  Moreover, the Court added in
a footnote, "it has remained an open question in this Court whether
evidence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be
admissible in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment.I'M
But the Court was on extremely shaky ground in differentiating
wiretapping cases from illegal search and seizure cases. The fourth
amendment also contains an explicit prohibition-it explicitly pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 605 does not
161. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
162. 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
163. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
164. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
165. Brief for the United States, p. 14, Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96
(1958), paraphrasing a statement by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
166. 355 U.S. at 102.
167. Id. at 102, n.10.
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expressly prohibit the use in evidence of articles obtained as a result
of wiretapping,1, -5 nor does the fourth amendment expressly prohibit
the use in evidence of articles obtained in an unreasonable search and
seizure. The exclusion of either kind of evidence in federal court is a
matter of judicial implication rather than the result of an express
statutory or constitutional mandate. '6 9 Accordingly, the Government
position in Benanti was unacceptable only because it could not estab-
lish that articles illegally seized by state officers are admissible in
federal court. But now, the decision in Benanti that articles obtained
through illegal wiretapping by state officers are inadmissible in
federal court has made applicable a converse argument, for it would
now be anomalous to hold that the statutory prohibition against wire-
tapping should be given greater protection than the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Reasoning
from the Benanti decision, it would seem a fortiori that articles
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure by state officers
will be held inadmissible in federal court.
"Courts proceed step by step," Justice Holmes once said.170 The
history of the use in federal court of illegally seized evidence sub-
stantiates this statement. Although the Supreme Court started off
uncertainly in Boyd and Adams, it took a definite position in Weeks
when it adopted a judicial rule of exclusion barring the use in
federal court of evidence obtained by federal officers in an illegal
search and seizure. Although the other part of the decision in
Weeks-that evidence illegally seized by state officers is admissible
in federal court-received affirmation in Center, Byars, and Feldman,
the premise upon which those decisions were founded was undercut
by the Wolf decision that an unreasonable search and seizure by state
officers violates the fourteenth amendment. It now appears that the
Court will finally resolve the uncertainties of the past by ruling that
168. In Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, the Court held inadmissible
the fruits of an illegal wiretap. The basis for this decision was not the plain
meaning of section 605, but, rather, the need for a judicially created rule of evi-
dence designed to give effect to section 605. Id. at 340-42; see McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, where Justice Frankfurter, the author of the Nardone
decision, indicated that the Nardone result was based upon a judicially formulated
rule of evidence. In Benanti, there was an actual violation of section 605 at the
trial because there was a divulgence of the existence of a wiretap. 355 U. S. at
100. However, the Court clearly indicated in Benanti that it would have reached
the same result if there had been no violation of section 605 at the trial but only
the use in evidence of articles obtained as a result of illegal wiretapping. Id. at
100, 102, n.9.
169. See note 168 supra and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
170. Jchnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
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evidence illegally seized by state agents is inadmissible in federal
court. Although this decision would not possess a clear-cut justifica-
tion on the grounds of judicial integrity, it would assist somewhat in
helping to deter future violations of the right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.
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